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INTRODUCTION
While our nation’s population skyrockets to new heights, its fresh
water supply is dwindling.1 Aquifers are lower and rivers drier,2 even in
regions traditionally labeled as “water-rich.”3 The United States depletes
its aquifers by roughly 2.3 trillion gallons of groundwater every day,4
pushing many beyond their sustainable yield. As the population continues
to grow, so will the demand for electricity generation,5 one of the largest
water-consuming industries in the United States.6 Even ignoring the
impacts of climate change on freshwater resources,7 many consider our

1. ROBERT GLENNON, UNQUENCHABLE: AMERICA’S WATER CRISIS AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 16–17, 23–102 (2009); SANDRA COLBY ET AL., U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, PROJECTIONS OF THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE U.S.
POPULATION: 2014 TO 2060 2 (Mar. 2015), available at https://www.census.gov
/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p25-1143.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/7KT4-25CB] (discussing population projections).
2. See, e.g., ROBERT GLENNON, WATER FOLLIES: GROUNDWATER PUMPING
AND THE FATE OF AMERICA’S FRESH WATERS 45–50 (2002).
3. See LEONARD KONIKOW, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., U.S. DEP’T OF INTER.,
GROUNDWATER DEPLETION IN THE UNITED STATES (1900–2008) (2013),
available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2013/5079/SIR2013-5079.pdf [https://
perma.cc/A2N4-X49B]; Kenneth Gould, An Introduction to Water Rights in the
Twenty-First Century: The Challenges Move East, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REV. 3, 4–5 (2002) (discussing Arkansas’s diminishing aquifer dilemma).
4. This determination is based on groundwater withdrawal estimates from
2000 to 2008. See Leonard Konikow, Contribution of Global Groundwater
Depletion Since 1900 to Sea-Level Rise, 38 GEOPH. RES. LETTERS L17401 (2011).
5. According to one estimate, the nationwide electricity demand will double
between 2000 and 2050. Benjamin Sovacool & Kelly Sovacool, Identifying
Future Electricity-Water Tradeoffs in the United States, 37 ENERGY POL’Y 2763,
2763 (2009). This may or may not occur because electricity demand years from
now is difficult to predict, especially given advances in electricity efficiency
technology.
6. MOLLY MAUPIN ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., ESTIMATED USE OF
WATER IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2010: CIRCULAR 1405 10 (2014), available at
http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/1405/pdf/circ1405.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZMW-T5UY].
7. See Kathleen Miller, Grappling with Uncertainty: Water Planning and
Policy in a Changing Climate, 5 ENVTL & ENERGY L. & POL’Y 395 (2011)
(discussing the impact of climate change on water management and the difficulty
of predicting precipitation pattern shifts).
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supply reserves to be dire.8 We may not have yet come to a crossroads in
our water consumption practices, but we are galloping toward it.
Those in the American West are well aware of the finite nature of our
country’s water resources. For generations, western water planners have
attempted to manage what little water supplies are available.9 While states
like California, Arizona, and Colorado have grown around a lack of water,
water scarcity concerns have begun to creep eastward since the 1980s.10
In 2014, many Texan towns struggled with the reality of what to do when
water was no longer available during droughts.11 Their creative solutions,
like recycling urine for drinking water,12 made the country’s water scarcity
problems hit home in a jarring way.
Western water markets offer the opportunity to address scarcity
problems through regulated free enterprise,13 yet nowhere does the
pressure to capitalize on water exploitation punch harder than in those
riparian jurisdictions bordering the Western Frontier: Minnesota, Iowa,
Missouri, Arkansas, and Louisiana. Normally, each of these states is
blessed with healthy rainfall and each enjoys the benefits of the
Mississippi River rolling along their eastern borders. They also happen to
be some of the historically poorest states in the country.
Their western sisters—in particular, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma,
and Texas—yearningly watch millions of gallons of water drain annually
away from their state lines. The populations in all of these western states
8. See GLENNON, supra note 2, at 45–50; U.S. DEP’T OF INTER., WATER
2025: PREVENTING CRISES AND CONFLICT IN THE WEST (2005) (outlining regions
in the western United States facing inadequate water supplies).
9. See NAT’L WATER COMM’N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE: FINAL
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES BY THE
NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION (1973).
10. Id.; see also GLENNON, supra note 1, at 23–35 (discussing Atlanta,
Georgia’s water scarcity issues); Robert Abrams, Interbasin Transfer in a
Riparian Jurisdiction, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 591, 591–92 (1983).
11. Everything You Need to Know About the Texas Drought, NPR.ORG,
https://stateimpact.npr.org/texas/tag/drought/ [https://perma.cc/X26D-E3DL] (last
visited Dec. 4, 2018).
12. Megan Gibson, Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: Drought-Stricken
Texas Town to Recycle Urine, TIME (Aug. 9, 2011), http://newsfeed.time.com
/2011/08/09/desperate-times-desperate-measures-drought-stricken-texas-town-torecycle-urine [https://perma.cc/T56N-J7J2]; Shelley Kofler, Drought-Stricken
Texas Town Turns to Toilets for Water, NPR (May 6, 2014, 3:35 AM),
http://www.npr.org/2014/05/06/309101579/ drought-stricken-texas-town-turns-totoilets-for-water [https://perma.cc/2U6J-KC5D].
13. See GLENNON, supra note 1, at 240, 307–08 (discussing Santa Fe’s water
bank and the impact of market forces on water use).
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are anticipated to grow through 2050.14 The demand for water is also likely
to rise in these agricultural hubs, which depend heavily on irrigation,15
placing additional strain on already limited water resources. The 100th
meridian, slicing through the middle of these states, is the generally
accepted marker for our country’s water divide—the partition between the
country’s two major water law regimes of riparian and prior
appropriation.16
Make no mistake, the water divide corridor between the 100th
meridian and the Mississippi River will be the battleground for some of
the most controversial interstate water transfer proposals of this century.
Huge demand neighbors an area of obvious supply. Texas in particular is
close to exhausting its water resources and has been for years.17 By
incentivizing drilling for groundwater and allowing landowners to mine
aquifers in excess of their supply,18 Texas has played a large part in
lowering the Ogallala Aquifer, the largest aquifer in the country.19
14. See generally Lloyd Potter & Nazrul Hoque, Texas Population
Projections, 2010 to 2050, OFF. OF ST. DEMOGRAPHER (2014), http://osd.texas
.gov/Resources/Publications/2014/2014-11_ProjectionBrief.pdf [https://perma.c
c/8UHZ-82GS]; Steve Barker, 2012 Demographics State of the State Report,
OKLA. DEP’T COM. 2 (2012), http://okcommerce.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/
06/Population_Projections_Report-2012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HE3F-2B9K];
Kansas Population Projections, 2014-2064, WICHITA ST. U. CTR. FOR ECON.
DEV. & BUS. RES. (2016), http://www.cedbr.org/content/2016/eConnection/
kansas_population_forecast_highlights.pdf [https:// perma.cc/L9YU-WL54];
Lissette Linares et al., Nebraska Population Projections to 2050 and Implications
10, U. NEB. OMAHA CTR. FOR PUB. AFF. RES. (2013), http://digitalcommons.un
omaha.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1039&context=datausers [https://perma.
cc/FU3K-8VFZ].
15. PUBLIC-SUPPLY WATER USE, U.S. GEO. SURV. (Oct. 27, 2016 8:57
A.M.), http://water.usgs.gov/edu/wups.html [https://perma.cc/8BPC-TUTF]
(comparing national population and water demand trends).
16. HERBERT YOUNG, UNDERSTANDING WATER RIGHTS AND CONFLICTS 42
(2d ed. 2006). For ease of discussion, this Article treats North Dakota, South
Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas as prior appropriation
jurisdictions, even though their water laws are more appropriately categorized as
a hybrid.
17. Nathan Weinert, Solutions for Interstate Groundwater Allocation and the
Implications of Day, 44 TEX. ENVTL L.J. 105, 125–27 (2014); Ronald Kaiser,
Texas Water Marketing in the Next Millennium: A Conceptual and Legal
Analysis, 27 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 181, 183 (1996).
18. See GLENNON, supra note 1, at 129.
19. Burke Griggs, Beyond Drought: Water Rights in the Age of Permanent
Depletion, 62 KAN. L. REV. 1263, 1264–65 (2014) (noting that the Ogallala
Aquifer has dropped by roughly a third of its total since 1900, an amount that
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Researchers estimate that roughly 70% of the aquifer will be consumed by
2060.20
Texas has always kept one eye on its neighbors’ water resources as its
municipalities, particularly Dallas and Fort Worth, continued to expand.21
During the 1990s, a few Texans pinpointed Louisianan water as a means
of recharging the Ogallala.22 In 2012, Texas sued the state of Oklahoma in
a bid to force the Sooner State into ceding some of its entirely intrastate
water.23 In August 2014, a Texas developer proposed building a pipeline
across southern Arkansas that would transport over 750 million gallons of
Mississippi River water per day to north Texas cities.24 While Texas water

cannot be recharged). The Ogallala, which underlies eight states, supplies
drinking water for around 80% of the population living above it. Weinert, supra
note 17, at 107 (citing Jim Malewitz, In Drought Ravaged Plains, Efforts to Save
a Vital Aquifer, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.pewstates.org/
projects/stateline/headlines/in-drought-ravaged-plains-efforts-to-save-a-vitalaquifer-85899460061 [https://perma.cc/K6V6-HXD7].
20. David Steward et al., Tapping Unsustainable Groundwater Stores for
Agricultural Production in the High Plains Aquifer of Kansas, Projections to
2110, NAT’L ACAD. SCI. (Aug. 26, 2013), http://www.pnas.org/content/110/37
/E3477.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4NV-DTDE].
21. See Robert Abrams, Interstate Water Allocation: A Contemporary Primer
for Eastern States, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 155, 155 (2002); Theresa
Schmidt, Concerns Raised Over Toledo Bend Waters Sales to Texas, KPLC.COM,
http://www.kplctv.com/story/16435687/concerns-over-proposed-toledo-bend-wa
ter-sales-to-texas [https://perma.cc/2GFN-DUG4] (last updated Aug. 26, 2012,
11:50 PM); Terrence Henry, The Louisiana-to-Texas Water Deal Is Off, NPR
(Jan. 16, 2012, 11:00 AM), https:// stateimpact.npr.org/texas/2012/01/16/thelouisiana-to-texas-water-deal-is-off/ [https://perma.cc/5P2N-RV3M].
22. See James Klebba, Water Rights and Water Policy in Louisiana: Laissez
Faire Riparianism, Market Based Approaches, or an New Managerialism?, 53
LA. L. REV. 1779, 1781 (1993).
23. See Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 569 U.S. 614 (2013).
24. BWG Corp. Application for Non-Riparian Water Use to Arkansas
Natural Resources Commission (submitted Aug. 20, 2014), available at http://
www.law.tulane.edu/uploadedFiles/Institutes_and_Centers/Water_Resources_Law_
and_Policy/Content/TXNonRipPermitApp.pdf. This bold proposal failed to outlive
the planning and permitting stage.

344404-LSU_80-3_Text.indd 87

8/17/20 7:18 AM

744

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

demand seems destined to continue growing,25 so does the temptation for
Louisiana and Arkansas to cash in on their water reserves.26
For centuries, we have looked to areas of abundant water to solve
water scarcity issues.27 The pressure to continue this approach will
undoubtedly continue.28 Despite the appeal that interstate water sales offer,
states tend to resist interstate water transfers for practical, ecological,
environmental, economic, and sociological reasons. For many, the shortterm gains from moving water outside of its natural watershed and across
state lines pale in comparison to the long-term impacts both to the area of
origin and downstream states.

25. See Water for Texas: 2017 State Water Plan, TEX. WATER DEV. BD.
(2017), http://www.twdb.texas.gov/waterplanning/swp/2017/doc/2017_SWP_A
dopted.pdf [https://perma.cc/77RL-DWM7] (estimating that Texas will need to
find 8.9 million acre–feet of water to meet the estimated statewide demand for
water in 2070). Although water transfer debates can easily center on Texas alone,
the demand for riparian water sources runs down the entire water divide corridor.
Since the 1980s, rumors have swirled around a western demand for water from
the Great Lakes region, which offers ambitious entrepreneurs the chance to tap
into one-fifth of the world’s surface water supply. See Irma Reinumagi, Diverting
Water from the Great Lakes: Pulling the Plug on Canada, 20 VALPARAISO U. L.
REV. 299, 300 (1986); Michael Donahue, Alicia Bixby, & David Siebert, Great
Lakes Diversion and Consumptive Use: The Issue in Perspective, 18 CASE W.
RES. J. OF ENVTL L. 19, 20–21 (1986).
26. See LA. REV. STAT. § 30:961(I) (2017) (allowing the state to sell and
export running surface waters); ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-22-303 (2011). Thus far,
Arkansas and Louisiana have resisted any interstate sales of water to Texas. Upon
pressure to sell water from its allocated portion of Toledo Bend, a man-made
reservoir on the state line, Louisiana actually increased restrictions for the sale of
water outside of the state. See Henry, supra note 21; LA. REV. STAT. §
38:2325(A)(16) (2017). Arkansas also appears unlikely to offer Texas any hope.
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-22-503 (2011) (“Any attempt to transport or export
any of [state] waters against the best interests of the State of Arkansas and its
inhabitants shall be strongly opposed.”). At least one authority believes that
Arkansas’s “strongly opposed” statute is potentially unconstitutional. See 1
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS (1st ed. 1991) at 9-176 (“[T]he validity of the
Arkansas statute is suspect to say the least.”).
27. Christine Klein, Water Transfers: The Case Against Transbasin
Diversion in the Eastern States, 25 UCLA J. ENVTL L. & POL’Y 249, 250 (2008).
28. See, e.g., Tristan Baurick, Louisiana May Sell Water to Drought-Stricken
Texas, NOLA (Dec. 8, 2017, 6:50 PM), http://www.nola.com/environment/
index.ssf/2017/12/louisiana_exploring_idea_of_se.html [https://perma.cc/S82KDAWC].
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Current United States Supreme Court jurisprudence prevents states
from banning such massive water diversions outright.29 States must
manage their water resources while, at the same time, considering
proposals to sell water across state lines. As a result, riparian jurisdictions
bordering the country’s water divide face intense scrutiny of their
decisions to send, or not send, water into the American West.30
A few have already addressed the riparian role in the interstate water
transfer debate.31 In particular, Mark Davis and Michael Pappas
considered the practicalities that riparian jurisdictions must deal with in
protecting their waters, highlighting legal mechanisms that these states can
utilize, such as water compacts, increased water supply monitoring, and
generally applicable water restrictions.32 This Article comes to the same
general conclusion—that water should typically stay where it naturally
flows—but urges riparian jurisdictions to instead consider their place in
the market as a means of conserving their water resources. Part I of this
Article dissects contemporary water law and marketing. Part II addresses
the myth of interstate water markets and highlights the impacts of
interbasin water transfers. Part III tackles the problem of pricing and how
riparian states can address interstate water transfers through their market
role.

29. See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
30. See Letter from Harry Vorhoff, Duncan Kemp, & Ryan Seidemann,
Assistant Att’ys Gen. of La., to Ken Brazil, Arkansas Nat. Res., (Dec. 3, 2015),
available at http://dnr.louisiana.gov/assets/OC/env_div/gw_res/StateofLouisiana
CommentLetters.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9KR-QWUT]; Letter from Kyle
Graham, Exec. Dir. of Coastal Prot. & Restoration Auth. of La., to Ken Brazil,
(Nov. 24, 2015), available at http://www.dnr.louisiana.gov/assets/OC/env_div/
gw_res/StateofLouisianaCommentLetters.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QLC8-4BSG];
Letter from Tegan Treadaway, Assistant Sec’y of Office of Envtl. Services for
State of La., to Thomas Biersel, (Oct. 21, 2015), available at http://www
.dnr.louisiana.gov/assets/OC/env_div/gw_res/StateofLouisianaCommentLetters.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HY59-7AMY]; Letter from Robert Barham, Sec’y to La. Dept. of
Wildlife & Fisheries, to Buddy Caldwell, La. Att’y Gen., (Nov. 3, 2015), available at
http://www.dnr.louisiana.gov/assets/OC/env_div/gw_res/StateofLouisianaComment
Letters.pdf [https://perma.cc/DQT6-3NGF].
31. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 21, at 255 (discussing the demand for
interstate water transfers and mechanisms that states can use to prevent export
post-Sporhase).
32. Mark Davis & Michael Pappas, Escaping the Sporhase Maze: Protecting
State Waters Within the Commerce Clause, 73 LA. L. REV. 175, 180–82, 198
(2012).
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I. THE BASIS FOR INTERSTATE WATER TRANSFERS
A. Surface Water Regimes
Regulation of water use in the United States today is almost entirely a
matter of state law. In what is surely one of the largest victories ever for
Tenth Amendment advocates, the federal government voluntarily ceded
regulation of the nation’s consumptive water use to states early in our
country’s history.33 In the absence of federal control, the states developed
their laws on surface water use into two main legal regimes: riparian
ownership and prior appropriation.
Based in the English common law, riparianism found favor among
water-rich jurisdictions along the East Coast.34 Initially, riparianism
allowed an individual owning land immediately adjacent to a waterbody
to use water for whatever purposes he desired on his own land.35 The
system later developed to allow a riparian owner only “reasonable use” of
a waterbody that does not harm or limit other riparian owners’ use.36
Today, some jurisdictions define interbasin water transfers to be an
unreasonable use of water.37 Most, however, allow for such transfers so
long as they do not harm other riparian owners’ use, and the transfers
achieve this goal by allowing only “excess” or “surplus” water to be
transferrable.38
As the country grew, western states began rejecting riparianism in
favor of prior appropriation. Today, prior appropriation regimes are
employed in mostly arid regions of the country and operate, at least

33. See Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142
(1935) (describing such inaction as “silent acquiescence”).
34. Jeremy Jungreis, “Permit” Me Another Drink: A Proposal for
Safeguarding the Water Rights of Federal Lands in the Regulated Riparian East,
29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 369, 372 (2005).
35. Id. at 374.
36. Id. at 374–75.
37. Abrams, supra note 10, at 599. An interbasin water transfer is the physical
relocation of water from one watershed into an entirely separate area. “Basin”
refers to the reach or watershed from which the water originates. The term is
different than an “intrabasin water transfer,” which relocates water from one
waterbody to another within the same watershed. Under the Sporhase Court’s
rationale discussed infra at Section I.C, prohibitions of interbasin transfers may
run afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause.
38. See, e.g., Michael White & Charles Eddy, Legal Planning for the Transfer
of Water Between River Basins: A Proposal for the Establishment of the
Interbasin Transfer Commission, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 809, 813, 845 (1970).
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theoretically, quite differently from riparian states.39 Originating in federal
mining law,40 prior appropriation guarantees water rights to individuals
putting water toward a beneficial use based on the time such a use actually
occurs, with priority for earlier users over later ones.41 Operating on the
mantra “first in time, first in right,” prior appropriation provides certainty
of flow for senior diverters; as water resources experience drought or
become over-appropriated, junior appropriators are cut off in favor of
senior water rights.42 Contemporary prior appropriation jurisdictions
heavily regulate any proposed use of water to prevent waste.43
Although these two models differ in theory, they are similar in modern
practice because both rely heavily on bureaucratic oversight.44 The modern
riparian model is often referred to as “regulated riparianism” because of
the substantial state oversight of large water withdrawals.45 In many ways,
regulated riparianism has come to resemble prior appropriation, the most
obvious of which is permitting water withdrawals that are prioritized by
the reasonableness of use and date on non-appurtenant land.46 Water rights
are based upon a permit—no longer strictly upon the riparian nature of the
land—and permitting agencies scrutinize the proposed use based on a
hierarchical list of acceptable uses.47

39. Jungreis, supra note 34, at 375–76.
40. See Irving v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855).
41. Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation in the Southeastern
States at the Opening of the Twenty-First Century, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REV. 9, 23 (2002).
42. Id. at 22–24.
43. Dan Tarlock, Prior Appropriation: Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?, 76 N.D.
L. REV. 881, 881 (2000). Colorado is the notable holdout among modern prior
appropriation systems, refusing to adhere to a permit system. In fact, the Colorado
Supreme Court has held that its citizens have a state constitutional right to apply
surface water to a beneficial use that cannot be controlled by permitting. See
Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch, 6 Colo. 443 (1882); COLO. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 5–6.
44. Some note little practice difference between the modern versions of the
two water paradigms. Reed Benson, Alive But Irrelevant: The Prior
Appropriation Doctrine in Today’s Western Water Law, 83 COLO. L. REV. 675,
675 (2012); J.W. Looney, An Update on Arkansas Water Law: Is the Riparian
Rights Doctrine Dead?, 43 ARK. L. REV. 573 (1990).
45. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Regulated Riparian Version of the ASCE
Model Water Code: The Third Way to Allocate Water, 30 J. OF AM. WATER
RESOURCES ASSOC. 197 (1994).
46. Jungreis, supra note 34, at 380–83.
47. Dellapenna, supra note 41, at 34.
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Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South
Dakota all operate hybrid water law regimes.48 Although these states
technically use riparianism as a base platform, they are, in reality, prior
appropriation jurisdictions because their regimes limit riparian rights by
date and function, just like prior appropriation states.49 It is fitting that
these states adopted a hybrid water regime because the 100th meridian
runs through their centers like an axis, signifying the country’s transition
to aridity.
Experts have debated the merits of riparianism versus prior
appropriation ad nauseam. Distinguishing between the two is important
here because, both geographically and hydrologically, states fall into one
of the two categories primarily based on one reason: the scarcity of water.
The country’s water divide between these two regimes provides a
convenient, if overly simplistic, visual of water scarcity along state lines.50
When discussing transfers across state lines, this boundary is critically
important because it separates the country’s main supply of fresh water
from the area carrying the largest demand.
B. Groundwater Management
Although the water divide indicates a shift in our country’s two main
surface water regimes, it also highlights a transition from a preference for
surface water use in the East to a heavy reliance on groundwater in the
West.51 The importance of groundwater cannot be overstated—roughly
25% of the nation’s consumed fresh water comes from aquifers.52 Most of
this groundwater goes toward drinking water and irrigation.53
Groundwater reliance is particularly heavy along the water divide corridor
48. TEX. WATER CODE §§ 11.001.561 (2018); Franco-American Charolaise,
Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568, 571 (Okla. 1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 82, § 105.2A (West 2019); City of Emporia v. Soden, 25 Kan. 410 (1881);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-701 et seq. (West 2019); Beerline Canal Co. v. Dep’t of
Water Res., 482 N.W.2d 11 (Neb. 1991); Spear T Ranch v. Knaub, 691 N.W.2d
116 (Neb. 2005); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 61-01-01 to -03 (West 2019); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 46-5-4 (2019).
49. See Dellapenna, supra note 41, at 29.
50. The U.S. Geological Survey also informally recognizes the divide
described here for its water publications. See MAUPIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 27.
51. Id.
52. GLENNON, supra note 1, at 129–30.
53. Forty-two percent of the nation’s total groundwater withdrawals are used
for irrigation in California, Arkansas, Texas, and Nebraska. MAUPIN ET AL., supra
note 6, at 7.
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in agriculture-dominated states like Arkansas, Kansas, Nebraska,
Oklahoma, and Texas.54
Like surface water, groundwater regulation developed on a state-bystate basis but settled into a very different framework. It is not uncommon
for a jurisdiction to use entirely different regimes for its surface water and
groundwater despite the scientific community having uniformly
recognized hydrologic continuity between the two.55 Five legal
groundwater regimes are at play in the country today: (1) absolute
ownership; (2) correlative rights; (3) reasonable use; (4) appropriative
rights; and (5) regulated riparianism.56
Absolute ownership is based on the common law rule of capture and
allows a landowner to utilize as much groundwater as he can withdraw
from his land.57 Because there is no limit on withdrawals, a landowner
cannot be liable for harming his neighbor’s property because of his water
use.58 Even though the system is routinely criticized as ignoring basic
science,59 absolute ownership is the model still used by Indiana,60 Maine,61
Texas,62 and, arguably, Louisiana.63
The correlative rights model allows a landowner to withdraw
groundwater only in proportion to his landholding and only from a safe
yield of the aquifer, which is the amount that may be recharged without
mining the aquifer.64 California is considered the leader of the correlative
54. Id.
55. See William Alley et al., Flow and Storage in Groundwater Systems, 296
SCIENCE 1985 (2002); RONALD GRIFFIN, WATER RESOURCE ECONOMICS: THE
ANALYSIS OF SCARCITY, POLICIES, AND PROJECTS 137 (2006); Joseph W.
Dellapenna, A Primer on Groundwater Law, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 265, 268 (2013).
56. Dellapenna, supra note 55, at 269–316 (analyzing the different regimes).
57. See Dellapenna, supra note 41, at 41–43.
58. Dean Baxtresser, Antiques Roadshow: The Common Law and the Coming
Age of Groundwater Marketing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 773, 779 (2010).
59. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Rise and the Demise of the Absolute
Dominion Doctrine for Groundwater, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 291
(2013) (analyzing the history and problems of the rule); Gerald Torres, Liquid
Assets: Groundwater in Texas, 122 YALE L. J. F. 143 (2012) (discussing problems
with Texas’s absolute ownership rule).
60. Dellapenna, supra note 55, at 318.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Compare LA. CIV. CODE art. 490 (2010), with LA. CIV. CODE art. 667
(2010), and Adams v. Grigsby, 152 So. 2d 619 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
64. When demand from an aquifer exceeds its recharge amounts, the
withdrawers are said to be “mining.” See Dennis Dimick, If You Think the Water
Crisis Can’t Get Worse, Wait Until the Aquifers are Drained, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC
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rights model.65 Of the states bordering the country’s water divide,
Oklahoma and Nebraska use a correlative rights regime.66
The reasonable use model, as close to a majority rule as can be found
among groundwater laws,67 seeks to balance the utility of competing uses
against each other. It allows unlimited withdrawals so long as the water is
used on the appurtenant land overlying the aquifer and does not
unreasonably harm others.68 In some jurisdictions, states prioritize their
uses and may curtail a landowner’s withdrawals in times of shortage
depending on the priority of use.69 The Restatement (Second) of Torts
generally advocates for the reasonable use standard and offers nine factors
to consider when determining reasonableness.70 Arkansas and Missouri
are states within the water divide corridor that apply the reasonable use
groundwater model.71
The appropriative rights model applies the same prior appropriation
system used for surface water to groundwater withdrawals72 and is the only
system that directly applies a surface water rule to groundwater.73 North
Dakota, South Dakota, and Kansas extend their prior appropriation rules
to groundwater, although these states arguably use a hybrid system, much
like their surface water laws.74
(Aug. 21, 2014), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/08/140819groundwater-california-drought-aquifers-hidden-crisis [https://perma.cc/R435-E
8RW]. Recharge is a two-way street; while rivers can refill an aquifer, aquifers
can likewise feed streams or rivers nearby. Where aquifer mining occurs, nearby
streams or springs can dry up completely, and well users will need to drill deeper
wells to continue withdrawing. Subsidence is another unfortunate result of aquifer
mining that can reduce property values and threaten public safety. J. David Aiken,
Ground Water Mining Law and Policy, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 505, 505–06 (1982).
65. See City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853 (Cal. 2000).
66. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, §§ 1020.1 to -.22 (West 2019); Prather v.
Eisenmann, 261 N.W.2d 767 (Neb. 1978).
67. See Dellapenna, supra note 41, at 44.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-22-910(c) (2011).
70. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858 (1977). Unlike the common
law reasonable use standard, the Restatement does not include the physical
location of water as one of the factors in its reasonableness determination. Id.
71. See Jones v. Oz-Ark-Val Poultry Co., 306 S.W.2d 111 (Ark. 1957); Ripka
v. Wansing, 589 S.W.2d 333 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
72. See Dellapenna, supra note 41, at 45–46.
73. Baxtresser, supra note 58, at 783.
74. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-701 to -707 (West 2019); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. §§ 61–01–01 to –01–03 (West 2019); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 46-6-1 to -3
(West 2019).
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The final groundwater model, regulated riparianism, requires
landowners to obtain a groundwater permit prior to drilling.75 The
permitting agency determines the reasonableness of the proposed
withdrawal based on a priority list of competing uses.76 Of the states within
the water divide corridor, Iowa and Minnesota use regulated riparianism
for their groundwater controls.77
C. The Supremes Declare, “There Shalt Be Commerce”
The clock is ticking on the West’s water shortage, but so far riparian
states have refused to sell their water resources across the water divide. If
riparian jurisdictions want to protect their resources from being used in
other states, then why not simply ban interstate water transfers outright?
Early in the 20th century, most states did precisely that.78 In 1982, the
Supreme Court halted this practice in Sporhase v. Nebraska by declaring
water to be an article of commerce that cannot be quite so easily
restricted.79
Sporhase is a pivotal case for prospective water markets that centers
on the Dormant Commerce Clause.80 This judicially created doctrine
limits states’ ability to favor their own citizens through prohibiting the sale
of a resource outside of the state.81 The Court determined that because
Congress has the constitutional power to regulate commerce “among the
several States,”82 states themselves cannot legislate in a manner that
creates an undue burden on interstate commerce, even in industries that
Congress has yet to regulate.83 As the argument goes, states should not be
able to prevent the flow of interstate commerce in order to favor their own
75. See Dellapenna, supra note 41, at 46–47.
76. Christine A. Klein, Mary Jane Angelo & Richard Hamann, Modernizing
Water Law: The Example of Florida, 61 FLA. L. REV. 403, 410–11 (2009).
77. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 455B.264(1) to .269 (West 2019); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 103G.005(17), 271 (West 2019).
78. See, e.g., Hudson Cty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908) (New
Jersey anti-export statute constitutional), overruled in part by Sporhase v.
Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
79. Sporhase, 458 U.S. 941.
80. Sporhase reversed the natural resource protectionism that Justice Holmes,
among others, had previously championed. See Hudson Cty., 209 U.S. 349 (antiwater export); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896) (state ownership of
wildlife).
81. See Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 42–43 (2003).
82. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
83. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
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citizens—regardless of whether Congress has actually begun regulating a
particular commodity crossing state lines.84
Under a Dormant Commerce Clause analysis, if state action unduly
burdens interstate commerce through a direct prohibition or its practical
effect, then courts are to review the state conduct under the strict scrutiny
standard of review.85 For the state action to survive strict scrutiny, the law
must serve a “legitimate local purpose,” and there must be no reasonable
nondiscriminatory alternative means of advancing the state interest,86
which can be nearly impossible to satisfy.87 If, instead, a state law merely
burdens interstate commerce but does not discriminate against out-of-state
commerce on its face or in practical effect, then courts apply a rational
basis approach under the moniker of the Pike balancing test.88 This rational
basis analysis favors upholding the state action by presuming that state
action is constitutional.89
As many have thoroughly analyzed Sporhase elsewhere,90 only a
snapshot is necessary here. In Sporhase, the state of Nebraska passed a
protectionist statute prohibiting the movement of groundwater outside of
the state without a permit from the state.91 At issue was Sporhase’s
proposed transport of groundwater across the Nebraska–Colorado state
line, an area whose aquifer supplies the state designated as “critical.”92 In
analyzing whether Nebraska’s prevention of a private individual from
84. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 531 (1949) (state
regulations that act “solely [for] protection of local economic interests, such as
supply for local consumption and limitation of competition” found
unconstitutional).
85. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979); Hunt v. Wash. State
Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 350–53 (1977).
86. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986); Klein, supra note 81, at 42–43.
87. See, e.g., Hunt, 432 U.S. at 353.
88. Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“Where the statute
regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its
effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits.”).
89. Id.
90. See Alan D. Greenberg, Sporhase v. Nebraska: The Muddying of
Commerce Clause Waters, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 215 (1983); Richard S.
Harnsberger, Josephine R. Potuto & Norman W. Thorson, Interstate Transfers of
Water: State Options After Sporhase, 70 NEB. L. REV. 754 (1991); Christine
Klein, The Dormant Commerce Clause and Water Export: Toward a New
Analytical Paradigm, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 131 (2011).
91. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 944 (1982).
92. Id. at 954–55.
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relocating out-of-state groundwater onto his own land ran afoul of
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce, the Court addressed the
Nebraskan statute that required: (1) an exporter to apply for a permit to
export; (2) the state Director of Water Resources to determine whether the
request was reasonable and within the public interest; and (3) the waterreceiving state to allow for reciprocal transfers into Nebraska before any
transfer could take place.93
The Sporhase Court identified three factors for consideration in its
analysis: (1) the state’s power to regulate water for the health of its citizens
under its police power; (2) the relevance of state boundaries in allocating
scarce resources; and (3) the ownership of water as a resource.94 The Court
judged that Nebraska’s interests in conserving and protecting its
groundwater resources were reasonable.95 It also found persuasive the fact
that the state of Nebraska held title to its groundwater under state law.96
The Court, however, took issue with Nebraska’s prohibition of exporting
groundwater to jurisdictions that did not allow for reciprocal transfers,
holding that the requirement ran afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause
and failed to pass a strict scrutiny analysis.97
Sporhase has done little more than muddy the waters as to what states
can and cannot do with their own resources. Some scholars feel that the
majority’s logic is flawed or the ruling was but a watershed moment in the
Court’s pro-Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence that has since
shifted in the opposite direction.98 Whatever its merits, Sporhase broadly
proclaimed water as an article of commerce and, even though only
groundwater was at issue, failed to distinguish between surface water and
groundwater.99
93. Id. at 944, 954–60.
94. Id. at 954–56.
95. Id. at 956. The majority noted that “[f]or Commerce Clause purposes, we
have long recognized a difference between economic protectionism, on the one
hand, and health and safety regulation, on the other.” Id.
96. Id. at 956–57.
97. Id. at 958 (“We . . . are not persuaded that the reciprocity requirement . . .
significantly advances the State’s legitimate conservation and preservation interest;
it surely is not narrowly tailored to serve that purpose.”).
98. See Klein, supra note 90, at 133; Klein, supra note 81, at 46.
99. See Bill Bronson, The Future of State Regulation of Interstate Water
Export After Sporhase v. Nebraska, 4 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 89, 99
(1983) (“Sporhase was concerned solely with groundwater, but an extension of
the reasoning to surface water follows a fortiori. Indeed, the majority opinion at
one point states ‘that water is an article of commerce.’ Thus, the scope of the
decision is all-encompassing.”).
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The Court again discussed interstate water transfers in 2013 in Tarrant
Regional Water District v. Herrmann, but only in passing.100 There, the
Court scrutinized river compact issues between Arkansas, Oklahoma,
Louisiana, and Texas concerning quantity allocations of the Red River.101
Despite being presented with Dormant Commerce Clause arguments
alternative to the compact issues—specifically, Oklahoma law prohibited
any export of water without legislative approval102— the Court punted the
opportunity to expound on Sporhase while unanimously reaffirming the
ruling.103 It stated that “the power of States to control water within their
borders may be subject to limits in certain circumstances. For example,
those imposed by the Commerce Clause.”104 Just as in Sporhase, the
Tarrant Regional Court failed to distinguish between surface water and
groundwater and, merely by citing Sporhase, implied that all waters are an
item of commerce, even though only surface waters were at issue.
II. THE RELATIVE MYTH OF INTERSTATE WATER MARKETS
A. What We Know About Interstate Water Marketing 30 Years PostSporhase
Despite the fact that riparianism imposes land restrictions upon water
use, periodic interstate water transfers in riparian states have occurred
throughout our nation’s history.105 The numerous canals dug for transport
throughout the country are, after all, transfers of water and tend to cross
state lines.106 Although a relative hiatus has existed since the 1980s,

100. Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 569 U.S. 614 (2013).
101. Id. at 614–36.
102. Id. at 636–38. Compare with Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 957 (“[T]he
continuing availability of groundwater in [a state] is not simply happenstance; the
natural resource has some indicia of a good publicly produced and owned in which
a State may favor its own citizens in times of shortage.”).
103. Herrmann, 569 U.S. at 632 n.11.
104. Id. That Justices Scalia or Thomas agreed to this language is surprising,
as both have been outwardly dismissive of the Dormant Commerce Clause. See
Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. Dep’t of Rev., 483 U.S. 232, 260–63 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); United Haulers Ass’n v.
Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 349 (2007) (Thomas,
J., concurring).
105. Abrams, supra note 10, at 591–92; Klein, supra note 27, at 249–50.
106. Two such examples are the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal (Delaware
–Maryland) and the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway (Mississippi–Alabama).
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drought and municipal demand have recently reinvigorated the cry for
interstate water transfers in the East.107
Immediately post-Sporhase, scholars began discussing the possibility
of interstate water markets under the assumption that the ruling kept
protectionist states from hindering markets from naturally forming.108
Such prediction was premised on the logical postulation that commerce
equated markets. These interstate markets would theoretically facilitate
sales from state or private actors to those willing to pay, sending water to
areas of higher demand and achieving a socially optimal outcome
regardless of state lines.109
No such markets have actually developed since Sporhase, at least not
in the widespread manner that many predicted.110 Since 1982, only six
states west of the Mississippi River—where demand should be the highest
and intrastate water marketing has a long history—have approved water
transfers into another jurisdiction.111 Of those six, only three have
authorized more than a single water transfer. What water has been moved
across state lines appears to be limited to individual water projects that

107. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Special Challenges to Water Markets in Riparian
States, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 305, 305–08, 321–27 (2004).
108. See, e.g., Bronson, supra note 99, at 111.
109. See, e.g., Victor Brajer et al., The Strengths and Weaknesses of Water
Markets as They Affect Water Scarcity and Sovereignty Interests in the West, 29
NAT. RESOURCES J. 489 (1989); Charles W. Howe, Economic, Legal, and
Hydrologic Dimensions of Potential Interstate Water Markets, 67 AM. J. AGRIC.
ECON. 1226, 1227 (1985).
110. See Brian Singleterry, Marketing Interstate Harmony: Interstate Water
Markets as an Alternative to Resolving Water Conflicts, 2 TEX. A&M L. REV. 527
(2015) (“Water markets within states have grown in popularity, but their use in
interstate allocation has not been significantly explored.”).
111. After contacting every state water authority west of the Mississippi River,
the author found that only the following states allowed one or more post-Sporhase
transfers of intra-state waters into a different jurisdiction: Iowa, Kansas,
Nebraska, Nevada, South Dakota, and Wyoming. Three states—Wyoming,
Nebraska, and Nevada—stuck out as having authorized more than just one or two
small-scale transfers in that time. South Dakota has reauthorized its single
interstate transfer multiple times. Although this finding must be taken with a huge
grain of salt—many jurisdictions only require permits for surface water transfers,
and perfect information is severely lacking—it does show an overwhelming trend
to keep water at its current location. Some water authorities went so far as to state
that they “would never allow” water exportation to occur.
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serve: (1) agriculture on farms crossing state lines, à la Sporhase; (2) rural
water systems; or (3) major projects in rural areas like casinos.112
The outliers here are the states of Wyoming, Nevada, and Nebraska,
all of which commonly transfer their waters out of state. These water
transfers do not necessarily mean that these three states have thriving
interstate water markets, however, and it is important to recognize the
limitations of permitting data.113 These jurisdictions impose a few
contingencies to ensure that these transfers are as limited as possible.
Wyoming draws the line at large-scale interstate transfers and keeps
transfer permits to a maximum of two years.114 Water transfers out of
Nebraska tend to utilize only a few acre–feet of groundwater for timelimited projects, and the state has no interstate surface water transfers on
record.115
Whatever can be gleaned from this snapshot of western water
transfers—and it is a very imperfect snapshot—no one can claim with a
straight face that interstate water markets are thriving. Interstate transfers
do not exist beyond a few states, if they even exist there at all. The vast
majority of states strongly disfavor transferring away their own waters,116

112. The Southwest Pipeline is one such transfer from North Dakota that
services rural customers in South Dakota. See Background of the Southwest
Pipeline Project, SOUTHWEST WATER AUTHORITY, http://www.legis.nd.gov/
assembly/61-2009/docs/pdf/wr120909appendixo.pdf [https://perma.cc/X2WEAPS9] (last visited Feb. 15, 2017).
113. Several of these transfers did not involve water sales and included water
“transfers” as small as center pivot irrigation systems that happen to circle into a
neighboring state. See, e.g., Neb. Groundw. Per. No. G-126300 (approved Nov.
12, 2002), available at http://nednr.nebraska.gov/Dynamic/Wells/Wells/Other
Info?WellId=144620 [https://perma.cc/VK4Q-NVJE].
114. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-3-110 to -115 (West 2019) (requiring legislative
approval for transfers involving 1,000 acre–feet or more annually); Ben Neary,
Wyoming State Engineer Rejects Permits for Pipeline to Draw from Green River
for Colorado, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jun. 8, 2015), http://trib.com/news/stateandregional/wyoming-state-engineer-rejects-permits-for-pipeline-to-draw from/
article_2343e916-1d52-5462-831a-aed1fcfa86e3.html [https://perma.cc/5NUPUBLM].
115. Phone call with Nebraska Dep’t of Nat. Res. (Nov. 2016).
116. The riparian jurisdictions sitting along the water divide corridor clearly
express this policy through statute or regulation. See LA CIV. CODE art. 658
(2010); MO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 640.409, .412 (West 2019); MINN. STAT. ANN.
6115.0670–.0710 (2016); ARK. NAT’L RES. COMM’N., ARKANSAS WATER PLAN
24–25 (2014); IOWA DEP’T NAT’L RES., IOWA WATER PLAN: WATER RIGHTS AND
ALLOCATION 6 (2010).
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including prior appropriation jurisdictions.117 The reasons for this are
obvious—political, social, and environmental forces likely defeat most
proposals early on before any real time or money is thrown into a project.
Moreover, intrastate demand remains incredibly high, as evinced by the
large amount of over-appropriated water supplies in western states.118
B. Major Problems Confronting Interstate Water Transfers
Interstate water markets have failed to live up to their promise largely
due to four reasons: (1) the return flow problem; (2) a disconnect between
water utility and costs; (3) imperfect information; and (4) externalities.119
Any one of these alone would be enough to discourage large-scale water
sales, but interstate water transfers need to simultaneously overcome all of
these issues. That is a big ask.
Perhaps the most fundamental issue plaguing these transfers is the
absence of return flow.120 Modern riparianism and prior appropriation
assume that some percentage of water withdrawn from a waterbody will
reenter that watershed through return flows.121 This assumption allows for
nearby users to have a limited impact on the waterbody as a whole. Some

117. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-81-101 (West 2019) (requiring
legislative approval for interbasin transfers); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 537.810
(West 2019) (same); City of Hugo v. Nichols, 656 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 2011)
(Oklahoma rejecting interstate sale of appropriated waters).
118. See Christine A. Klein, Water Bankruptcy, 97 MINN. L. REV. 560, 569–
71 (2012) (discussing overappropriation).
119. Although these are broken into distinct categories, they all tend to tie into
one another. A loss of return flow, for example, will have known externalities,
which may themselves be difficult to measure because of imperfect information.
120. See TERRY ANDERSON & PETER HILL, WATER MARKETING, THE NEXT
GENERATION 108 (1997) (discussing return flow); J. David Aiken, Selling
Nebraska’s Water: Water Sales, Transfers and Exports, in CTR. FOR PUB. AFF.
RES. 89, 99 (Russell L. Smith ed., 1988).
121. See Robert E. Beck, The Regulated Riparian Model Water Code:
Blueprint for Twenty-First Century Water Management, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y REV. 113, 136 (2000); H. Stuart Burness & James P. Quirk, Water
Law, Water Transfers, and Economic Efficiency: The Colorado River, 23 J.L. &
ECON. 111, 124 (1980); see also DAVID LEWIS FELDMAN, WATER POLICY FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 201 (2007) (“Generally, diverting water from the
drainage area of a stream without return flow, a practice harmful to instream flow,
is deemed unreasonable and, if a downstream riparian complains, is forbidden.”).
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prior appropriation jurisdictions even label users that fail to facilitate
return flows as wasteful and impose penalties.122
The classic interstate water transfer proposal, a pipeline from one state
into another, would wholly remove water from the hydrologic processes
of the basin of origin, thereby eliminating all return flows. It is almost a
truism that any interstate water transfers would also be interbasin water
transfers because water transferred across state lines would usually leave
its natural watershed.123 The results of zero return flow are extremely
harmful to basins of origin and are precisely why prior appropriation
jurisdictions try to facilitate return flows.124 It would be a difficult task,
from an economic and environmental standpoint, to convince any
jurisdiction to negotiate water transfers where there is a guarantee of no
return flows.
The second problem involves a disconnect between utility and cost.
Basic microeconomics suggest that a commodity’s utility will exhibit a
decline curve as demand increases.125 Water is no exception.126 While
water’s utility should only marginally increase with each unit consumed,
the opportunity cost for selling jurisdictions is prohibitively high.127 Left
untouched, water still provides innumerable benefits to its basin of origin,
including existing utility, in-stream benefits like recreation and habitat,
and opportunity for new uses.128 For their waters to be transferred, selling
jurisdictions would have to willingly forego using that water, sacrificing
whatever functions the water would have normally served.129 In order for
122. See Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. State Bd. of Control, 578 P.2d 557 (Wyo.
1978) (appropriator’s “duty of water” breached by waste of return flows).
123. This will, of course, depend on the particular characteristics of the
proposal. It would be largely unnecessary to sell water downstream within the
same watershed—most states already compact their allocated portions of
upstream rivers—and too cost-prohibitive to pump water back up to upper
reaches.
124. See infra, Section II.A; see also Phil King, Return Flow Efficiency, N.M.
WATER RES. INST. (Oct. 2008), http://www.wrri.nmsu.edu/publish/watcon/proc
53/king.pdf [https://perma.cc/DD3V-72ME] (discussing return flow engineering).
125. GRIFFIN, supra note 55, at 23–28.
126. Id. at 34. Marginal utility will vary among regions and consumers due to
relativity.
127. Id. at 41–43 (defining opportunity cost as “the value of the next best
selection that could have been undertaken.”).
128. See Notie Lansford & Lonnie Jones, Recreational and Aesthetic Value of
Water Using Hedonic Price Analysis, 20 J. AGRIC. & RES. ECON. 341 (1995)
(discussing a willingness to pay more for waterfront property values).
129. That water might be sold from an individual is immaterial to this
principle. The exporting individual must still obtain approval from the state.
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an interstate water transfer to actually come to fruition, the purchasing
jurisdiction’s perceived increase in utility must be high enough to push
demand far enough to compensate the selling jurisdiction’s actual and
opportunity costs.130
The third issue, imperfect information, goes hand in hand with water
marketing.131 The lack of good data requires broad engineering,
hydrologic, and environmental estimates for water transfers proposals—a
factor that surely creates skeptics of even the most willing sellers. Further
complicating these issues is the fact that problems caused by transferring
water out of its watershed can be extremely difficult to track. Even basic
groundwater monitoring can be difficult, as wells often show evidence of
change only after years of competent data collection.
Interstate water transfer proposals tend to downplay externalities, the
fourth major issue confronting such transfers.132 The focus is on how to
get more water to satisfy demand and rarely, if ever, on whether taking
water from a location places that situs at an increased risk of harm.133 This
kind of reasoning is short-sighted; the real question is whether taking the
water from its natural location is the right thing to do.134
Watersheds develop because they act as a natural funnel for water.135
They do not exist to hold the minimum or “normal” streamflow. Rather,
watersheds are formed by millennia of flooding.136 Annually removing a

130. This is the “marginal net benefit.” See GRIFFIN, supra note 55, at 36
(defining marginal net benefit as the marginal benefit minus marginal costs).
131. See Bonnie Saliba et al., Do Water Market Prices Appropriately Measure
Water Values?, 27 NAT. RES. J. 617, 645 (1987) (discussing imperfect information
in markets).
132. See, e.g., Singleterry, supra note 110; Max Michon-Rollens, Turning Off
the Valves: Why Tarrant v. Herrmann Unnecessarily Threatens Interstate Water
Markets, 41 ECOLOGY. L.Q. 403, 414 (2014).
133. See DAVID GRINLINTON & PRUE TAYLOR, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
SUSTAINABILITY: THE EVOLUTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS TO MEET ECOLOGICAL
CHALLENGES 190–191 (2011).
134. I pass no judgment on what would be the “right” thing to do because that
would depend on the mores and realities of a given jurisdiction. Economics
demands that any proposed transfer at least be the socially optimal choice in that
society derives the greatest overall benefit from such a transfer. See TERRY
ANDERSON & PETER HILL, WATER MARKETING, THE NEXT GENERATION 108
(1997) (discussing externalities in the context of interstate water transfers).
135. Geologically speaking, water carves its own path.
136. See, e.g., 2 PETER CALOW & GEOFFREY E. PETTS, RIVERS HANDBOOK:
HYDROLOGICAL AND ECOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES 405–13 (1994); Abrams, supra
note 10, at 595 n.29; Brian Thomas, et al., Precipitation Intensity Effects on
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portion of that water will, over time, stifle a watershed’s natural
evolution.137 A given jurisdiction could decide that the benefits of a water
transfer outweigh externalities or that the externalities can be addressed;
in order to do that, however, it would need to properly identify the impacts
of such a transfer.
Although there is a lack of reliable information about interstate water
transfers, interbasin water transfers within a single jurisdiction have
created well-documented externalities.138 These externalities include: (1) a
loss of dilution power for environmental permitting;139 (2) harm to
deltas;140 (3) coastline loss;141 (4) saltwater intrusion;142 (5) destruction of

Groundwater Recharge in the Southwestern United States, 8 WATER 90 (2016)
(analyzing the impact of high intensity precipitation events on aquifer recharge).
137. Davis & Pappas, supra note 32, at 180–81 (“The logic is so simple as to
be obvious: water-based environments require water to survive. . . . In fact,
because . . . eastern ecosystems have evolved around a greater abundance of water,
they frequently require a greater quantity of water than do those in the West.”).
138. Charles Howe, Innovative Approaches to Water Allocation: The Potential
for Water Markets 6, WESTERN WATER : EXPANDING USES/FINITE SUPPLIES
(summer conference) (Jun. 2–4, 1986), available at http://scholar.law.colo
rado.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1013&context=western-water-expandinguses-finite-supplies [https://perma.cc/76P2-5RAS]; see also George A. Gould, A
Westerner Looks at Eastern Water Law: Reconsideration of Prior Appropriation
in the East, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 89, 112–13 (2002) (discussing “third
party effects” and indirect externalities created by water transfers).
139. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251–1387 (2012).
140. See NAT’L WATER COMM’N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE: FINAL
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 28–29
(1973); DAVID GETCHES, WATER CONSERVATION, REUSE, AND RECYCLING:
PROCEEDINGS OF AN IRANIAN-AMERICAN WORKSHOP 238–39 (2005) (discussing
the cumulative impact of interbasin water transfers on the Colorado River delta);
WILLIAM L. WANT, LAW OF WETLANDS REGULATION §§ 2:2–2:3 (2009)
(discussing the importance of wetlands). Water transfer advocates face their
toughest opponents in endangered species, as approximately 20% of all
endangered species heavily depend on wetlands for food or habitat. Id. at §2:3.
141. Richard Kesel, The Role of the Mississippi River in Wetland Loss in
Southeastern Louisiana, U.S.A., 13 ENVTL. GEOLOGY. & WATER SCI. 183 (1989)
(discussing reduced sediment flows); Emma Marris, Natural Disasters: The
Vanishing Coast, 438 NATURE 908, 908–09 (2005).
142. Salinization issues are not limited to coastal regions because many deep
aquifers in the United States contain saline that can intrude into shallower aquifers
due to withdrawals, pressure difference, and gradient difference. WILLIAM M.
ALLEY ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, SUSTAINABILITY OF GROUND-WATER
RESOURCES: U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY CIRCULAR 1186 (1999).
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wildlife habitats;143 (6) economic hits to rural communities;144 (7) reduced
recharge for drinking water aquifers;145 and (8) loss of a state-owned
resource.146 In jurisdictions that recognize a public trust in water,147 these
externalities present multigenerational legal conundrums.148 There are
third-party externalities to consider as well, because increased strain on a
waterbody is likely to impact downstream states.149 The few externalities
highlighted here show that interstate water transfer proposals could serve
to unify a wide range of politically diverse interest groups in opposition.
143. Bryan Davies et al., An Assessment of the Ecological Impacts of Interbasin Water Transfers, and Their Threats to River Basin Integrity and
Conservation, 2 AQUATIC CONSERVATION: MARINE AND FRESHWATER
ECOSYSTEMS 325, 345–46 (1992).
144. See Shiney Varghese, Water Governance in the 21st Century: Lessons
from Water Trading in the U.S. and Australia, INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POL’Y
2 (2013); GRIFFIN, supra note 55, at 230–31.
145. See FLUID MECHANICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL INTERFACES 256–57 (Carlo
Gualtieri & Drugtin T. Mihailovic eds., CRC Press 2d ed. 2012); G.C. Poole et
al., Hydrologic Spiraling: The Role of Multiple Interactive Flow Paths in Stream
Ecosystems, 24 RIVER RES. & APPLICATIONS 1018 (2007), http://data
.umatilla.nsn.us/staff/downloads/Poole_et_al_2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/CUF2NCVB]; Andrew Boulton et al., Ecology and Management of the Hyporheic Zone:
Stream-Groundwater Interactions of Running Waters and Their Floodplains, 29
J. N. AM. BENTHOLOGICAL SOC’Y 26, 36 (2010) (“Large river floodplains and
their aquifers and hyporheic zones are the most endangered landscapes on the
planet.”).
146. States typically claim fee title ownership of intrastate surface waters. See,
e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 9:1101 (2018).
147. See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970) (outlining the
doctrine); see, e.g., LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; see also Louisiana Seafood Mgmt.
Council v. Louisiana Wildlife & Fisheries Comm’n, 719 So. 2d 119, 124 (La. Ct.
App. 1st Cir. 1998); ARK CODE ANN. § 15-20-302.
148. See Amelia Frenkel, Interstate Water Rights: Take No Drop for Granted,
40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 253, 266 (2016); Hudson Cty. Water Co. v. McCarter,
209 U.S. 349 (1908).
[F]ew public interests are more obvious, indisputable and independent
of particular theory than the interest of the public of a State to maintain
the rivers that are wholly within it substantially undiminished, except by
such drafts upon them as the guardian of the public welfare may permit
for the purpose of turning them to a more perfect use. This public interest
is omnipresent wherever there is a State, and grows more pressing as
population grows.
Hudson Cty. Water Co., 209 U.S. at 356.
149. See Florida v. Georgia, 138 U.S. 2502 (2018).
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Considering that the typical purchaser faces a burden of showing that the
transfer is within the public interest of the basin of origin,150 that weight
appears nearly impossible to overcome, as shown by the lack of developed
markets throughout the country.
III. DEALING WITH (AND IN) INTERSTATE WATER MARKETS
A few things are clear under current Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Express limitations on interstate water transfers, or those that burden the
markets in practical effect, must pass strict scrutiny because they are
facially discriminatory and burden an item of commerce.151 Prohibitions
that are not facially discriminatory, such as bans on interbasin water
transfers, are still subject to the Pike balancing test.152 Public health and
safety are compelling government interests that may be invoked to prohibit
such transfers but are most appropriate in times of drought or other
emergency.153 Even during times of such an emergency, however, transfer
prohibitions must be narrowly tailored to achieve these interests.154
The contemporary issue is not whether states can outright prohibit
interstate water transfers—Sporhase quite audibly answered that
question—but how states can manage their resources without offending
Congress’s commerce powers. Although it seems unlikely that any
individual purchaser will ever be able to satisfy the numerous burdens
required to move a large amount of water across state lines, ours is a land
of opportunity and optimism. New interstate water transfer proposals seem

150. See, e.g., NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 6 (West 2019) (“The right to divert
unappropriated waters of every natural stream for beneficial use shall never be
denied except when such denial is demanded by the public interest.”).
151. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 954–57 (1982); see also Bronson,
supra note 99, at 102 (“The unconditional embargo invites almost immediate
suspicion because of its facially discriminatory nature.”).
152. Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“Where the statute
regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its
effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits.”).
153. The Supreme Court notably failed to list environmental health among the
acceptable compelling governmental issues in Sporhase. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at
956. But see Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 (1986) (states are not required
“to sit idly by and wait until potentially irreversible environmental damage has
occurred or until the scientific community agrees on what . . . [is or is] not
dangerous before it acts to avoid such consequences.”).
154. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 957–58.
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to pop up almost annually.155 Should the entrepreneurial spirit carry a
potential purchaser beyond the common pitfalls, riparian jurisdictions are
stuck between a proposal they would clearly disfavor and the implied limit
of their power. Moreover, the Sporhase framework actually creates the
potential for the prior appropriation regime to creep into riparianism
through the guise of interstate water markets,156 undermining the important
policy divisions between the two regimes. These diversions would not
have to fight any seniority battle because they would be another
“reasonable use” within the transferring riparian jurisdiction, which may
not necessarily use timing as a priority. One solution to riparian
jurisdictions’ plight lies, ironically, in the auspices of the market.
A. The Players
Interstate water transfers do not really operate within a market. Such
proposals are typically one-time offers between two geographically
adjacent actors, one of whom will almost always be a governmental actor
or heavily regulated entity.157 There is no free market where potential
buyers could go and shop for a better price;158 the proposal occurs in a
vacuum bound by geography and cost-of-transport restraints. The term
“market,” although used extensively in the literature, is thus a misnomer
because such highly regulated sales in no way resemble a free market.159
155. See James O’Neill, N.J. Water: Plan to Sell to N.Y. Raises Concerns,
NORTHJERSEY.COM (Nov. 15, 2016, 2:46 PM), http://www.northjersey.com/
story/news/environment/2016/11/14/new-jersey-water-plan-sell-ny-raises-con
cerns/9 3793876/ [https://perma.cc/Q964-WJJY] (discussing a 2016 interstate
water transfer proposal from a New Jersey reservoir to New York); Tristan
Baurick, Louisiana May Sell Water to Drought-Stricken Texas, TIMES–PICAYUNE
(Dec. 8, 2017, 6:50 PM), https://www.nola.com/news/environment/article
_f1538766-d95-5314-b48d-2785d541dad1.html [https://perma.cc/S82K-DAWC]
(discussing a potential 2018 sale of Louisiana water to Texas).
156. Prior appropriation literally facilitates water diversion, while riparianism
largely does not. Since nearly all water transferred across state lines will also leave
its natural watershed, these interstate water sales are, by definition, a diversion
put to beneficial use. See Abrams, supra note 10, at 592–93.
157. Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Importance of Getting Names Right: The
Myths of Markets for Water, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL L. & POL’Y REV. 317, 324–
26 (2000).
158. The Supreme Court has noted that the free market is a key principle to the
Dormant Commerce Clause. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n,
432 U.S. 333, 351–52 (1977). It is logical, then, that the Dormant Commerce
Clause should not hamstring circumstances that lack a meaningful market setting.
159. GRIFFIN, supra note 55, at 240.
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Realistically, the only entities that possess enough surface water to
justify the expense of interstate water sales are riparian states. Purchasing
entities will want to reduce their investment risks, which will almost
certainly lead them to state actors.160 These jurisdictions grant their
riparian landowners certain property rights to waterbodies, but those rights
are usufructuary in nature.161 They are typically rights to use water, not to
actually own the water itself.162 These states hold title to their water,163
except for minor exemptions like artificial lakes.164
Groundwater, however, is a completely different playing field.
Groundwater rights are generally less usufructuary and more real propertybased.165 All of the groundwater regimes, save the reasonable use rule,166
theoretically allow for groundwater to be sold across state lines.167 These
160. It is unlikely that there will be any individual landowners that possess a
private reservoir large enough to tempt water purchasers. See GRIFFIN, supra note
55, at 240 (“Agents involved in such risk-averse activities want an ensured water
supply.”).
161. See JOSHUA GETZLER, A HISTORY OF WATER RIGHTS AT COMMON LAW
308, 329–30 (2004).
162. Id. at 330 (“[T]he right to use and enjoy without diminishing the
underlying corpus of property . . . .”).
163. LA CONST. art IX, § 1; Ark. River Rights Comm. v. Echubby Lake
Hunting Club, 126 S.W.2d 738, 743 (Ark. 2003) (citing State v. McIlroy, 595
S.W.2d 659 (Ark. 1980)); Larman v. State, 552 N.W.2d 158, 161 (Iowa 1996)
(citing State v. Sorenson, 436 N.W.2d 358, 361 (Iowa 1989)); Louisiana Seafood
Mgmt. Council v. Louisiana Wildlife & Fisheries Comm’n, 719 So. 2d 119, 124
(La. Ct. App. 1 Cir. 1998); Lamphrey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn.
1893); Pratt v. State Dep’t of Nat. Res., 309 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1981);
Bollinger v. Henry, 375 S.W.2d 161, 165 (Mo. 1964); City of Springfield, Mo. v.
Mecum, 320 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959). It should be noted that
reasonable minds can disagree on this point. Some advocate that surface waters
are not owned by any one entity but are instead subject to the rule of capture. The
author thanks G. Alan Perkins for this golden nugget.
164. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §22-5-404 (2019).
165. As states began writing their water laws, groundwater was nearly
impossible to track, while surface water flows could be easily observed.
166. See Baxtresser, supra note 58, at 780–81 (discussing the reasonable use
restriction on groundwater exports).
167. It remains to be seen whether a prohibition of groundwater sales away
from the tract immediately above an aquifer is an impermissible burden on
interstate commerce. The Sporhase majority appears to indicate that the
reasonable use’s appurtenance requirement would run afoul of Congress’s
commerce power. See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 959–60 (1982) (“The
negative implications of the Commerce Clause, like the mandates of the
Fourteenth Amendment, are ingredients of the valid state law to which Congress
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frameworks were not designed to sustain interstate groundwater markets,
and states would likely need to update their groundwater laws in the event
that such transfers loom.168
Even the low-hanging fruit poses significant hurdles to interstate water
purchasers. Reservoirs bordering two states should have a unique appeal
to purchasers because they offer reduced transportation and infrastructure
costs, yet compacts, treaties, or the Supreme Court have apportioned all
such waters in this country.169 Although states could reapportion or, more
likely, lease some of their apportioned interstate waters to a neighboring
jurisdiction, such reallocation would require congressional approval.170
This red tape means that states have entered into only five new compacts
since 1980.171
B. If They Must Exist…
The key to achieving the balance between prior appropriation states’
demand and riparian jurisdictions’ desire to conserve their waters is
effective pricing. Riparian states contemplating interstate water proposals
have the upper hand; they hold a valuable resource—which many consider
invaluable—during a period of rising demand. A sale of this resource will
create both direct and indirect losses to their citizens and wildlife, not to
mention downriver states. The price of water needs to reflect these realities

has deferred. Neither the fact that Congress has chosen not to create a federal
water law to govern water rights involved in federal projects, nor the fact that
Congress has been willing to let the States settle their differences over water rights
through mutual agreement, constitutes persuasive evidence that Congress
consented to the unilateral imposition of unreasonable burdens on commerce.”)
(citations omitted).
168. See Baxtresser, supra note 58, at 778–86 (2010); GRIFFIN, supra note 55,
at 234.
169. One quick but important caveat is necessary. Many surface waterbodies
border two states and often form state boundaries. Those waters are allocated to
adjacent states under a unique body of law that is not addressed here, primarily
because no transfers occur and the law is so well-defined. See Abrams, supra note
21, at 155. Rest assured that although this Article might seem to implicate sales
from those “interstate waters,” that scenario is outside of the scope of transfers
addressed here.
170. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 3.
171. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Interstate Struggles Over Rivers: The Southeastern
States and the Struggles over the ’Hooch, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 828, 836 (2005).
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and, quite frankly, act as a deterrent to interstate water transfers that
encourages better consumption practices within the area of demand.172
Interstate water market problems arise under the Dormant Commerce
Clause, so it is appropriate for states to take advantage of another Courtcreated doctrine to effectively conserve their resources: the market
participant exception.173 The Supreme Court has recognized that even
though Congress has authority over interstate commerce, a state may favor
its own citizens where it is an actor within a market.174 The Court has
continually expanded the market participant doctrine since its creation,175
and it has also held that the exception expressly circumvents the Dormant
Commerce Clause.176
The quintessential example of the market participant exception is
college tuition, where state colleges charge higher tuition to out-of-state
students than to their own citizens.177 Higher water prices for interstate
transfers function in much the same manner, allowing states to provide
their own citizens with the benefit of water, at little to no cost, while
pricing out most out-of-state buyers. Only those out-of-state actors with
the means and desire can buy into the market. This is appropriate because
the market participant exception allows a state to act as “guardian and
trustee for its people” in choosing its trade partners and contract terms—
mirroring a state’s role in conserving its water resources.178
High water rates in interstate transfers accomplish many desirable
outcomes through the natural forces of a market. They force arid regions
172. See GRIFFIN, supra note 55, at 150–51, 256 (discussing the benefits of
increased water rates).
173. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976) (“Nothing in the purposes animating the
Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional action, from
participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over
others.”). Not all agree with this reading of the market participant doctrine. See 9
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS (1st ed. 1991) at 710–22.
174. See White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Emp’rs, 460 U.S. 204, 208 (1983).
175. Compare Hughes, 426 U.S. 794 (first recognizing the exception in dicta),
with White, 460 U.S. 204 (city can require all private construction companies and
subcontractors to hire at least half of city residents for public city construction
projects). But see Wisconsin Dept. of Ind. v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282 (1986)
(government’s regulation of market not a participant in the market itself).
176. See South Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 93 (1984)
(Dormant Commerce Clause places no limitation on state acting as a market
participant, as opposed to a market regulator).
177. See Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 327 (1983); Sturgis v.
Washington, 368 F. Supp. 38, 41 (W.D. Wash 1973), aff’d, 414 U.S. 1057 (1973).
178. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 438 (internal quotations omitted).
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to first look at conservation methods and ways to reduce demand. They
educate consumers about water scarcity, who should then respond to
higher water prices by reducing their individual demand or finding more
effective means to consume water.179 These high rates also promote the
conservation of fish, wildlife, and ecosystems in water-rich areas that
require large amounts of water.180 They theoretically compensate citizens
in selling jurisdictions for their losses. Additionally, they reimburse
riparian states themselves for the lost public resource, who can then
reinvest the revenues into their states. This is not the “economic
protectionism” that the Sporhase Court admonished181 but is instead sound
governance achieved through economics—if enough attention is focused
on calculating cost and price.
Riparian jurisdictions have some power to regulate private
groundwater sales under their police power.182 Not only can these
jurisdictions prohibit transfers for public health and safety reasons,183 but
they can also impose fees or taxes on water purchasers that are cost
estimates of the mitigation efforts necessary to combat interstate water
transfer externalities.184 Groundwater sellers would pass these costs onto
their buyers, resulting in the same high water valuation that riparian
jurisdictions would demand for their surface waters. These fees can act as
a general deterrent to keep opportunistic buyers from making a quick buck
179. Nelson D. Schwartz, Water Pricing in Two Thirsty Cities: In One,
Guzzlers Pay More, and Use Less, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2015), https://www.ny
times.com/2015/05/07/business/energy-environment/water-pricing-in-two-thirst
y-cities.html [https://perma.cc/E34Y-FG3X].
180. The Supreme Court has noted that the national interest “tends to coincide”
with this conservation in water-rich states. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941,
954 n.16 (1981) (quoting Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S.
179, 188 (1950)). See also Davis & Pappas, supra note 32, at 180 (“The logic is
so simple as to be obvious: water-based environments require water to survive.
Thus, unsurprisingly, when rivers and streams are deprived of adequate supplies
of flowing water, the effects on wildlife are often devastating.”) (internal citations
omitted).
181. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 956.
182. Id. at 956–57.
183. Id. at 954–56.
184. These water tariffs allow for authorizing jurisdictions to combat the evils
of groundwater sales. GRIFFIN, supra note 55, at 240 (distinguishing between
water tariffs and rates). This tax would be akin to the severance tax that states
routinely imposed on natural resource exploitation. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §
26-58-107 (2019). At least one leading water law scholar felt that a state should
use its sovereign power to tax in order to combat a loss of tax revenue from
exported waters. See 9 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 726–738 (1st ed. 1991).
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off of landowners who may not foresee or care about the long-term
problems. It will also move the true cost of water loss onto areas of
demand, achieving a more equitable outcome.185 Although these fees
could be subject to a Dormant Commerce Clause analysis, they would
likely pass muster if constructed to limit interbasin transfers.186
C. What Is Water Worth?
Interstate water sales are much like a potential home buyer knocking
on the front door of a house that he likes. Upon meeting the owner, he asks
to buy the house for a sum certain. The homeowner has no incentive to
accept this initial amount if he is satisfied with his home and had not
planned on moving. If the homeowner is rational, he will counter with an
amount that is much higher than the buyer’s initial proposal. His position
is a win–win: Either the potential buyer will accept the high price, or he
will not. If he does not, the homeowner continues on as if nothing
happened, satisfied with his home and happy to retain it. If he does, then
he has turned himself into a willing seller by demanding a price so high
that he could no longer justify ignoring it.
Riparian jurisdictions are in the same enviable position. They have no
pressure to sell, and they certainly have no incentive to sell at the initial
asking price.187 If riparian jurisdictions act rationally,188 they should
demand a premium price in order to compensate their citizens for a lack
of water and to turn a conceptual profit of some kind.189 This way, selling

185. Saliba et al., supra note 131, at 620 (“A measure of value should fully
reflect potential beneficiaries’ willingness to pay for incremental increases in
water supply, as well as any positive or negative side effects (externalities)
associated with the supply increase.”).
186. See Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Sporhase, 458 U.S.
at 956–58; Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 (1986).
187. See Richard Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer
Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827 (2006) (“The existence of a one-sided contract
does not imply that the transaction will be one-sided, but only that the seller will
have discretion with respect to how to treat the consumer.”).
188. The assumption of rational actors is foundational to economics. See
Richard Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REV. 757, 761 (1975)
(“The basis of an economic approach to law is the assumption that the people
involved with the legal system act as rational maximizers of their satisfactions.”).
189. States clearly have the power to do this under the Dormant Commerce
Clause. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977)
(“[I]n the absence of conflicting legislation by Congress, there is a residuum of
power in the state to make laws governing matters of local concern which
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states may either: (1) hold onto their water resources by pricing out
potential suitors; or (2) turn themselves into willing sellers that can combat
the detriments of the sale while still maximizing social value.190 In order
to do that, however, potential sellers must have some idea how to price
their commodity.
Fair market value is traditionally defined as the price point that a
willing buyer will pay to a willing seller—a divergence of two competing
interests.191 For interstate water transfers, one would expect that price to
be extremely high.192 Within these sales, there is a limited resource and a
natural competition for that resource between the seller and the purchaser.
Water-rich jurisdictions hold the market power. They have thus far
wielded that power to keep any interstate water markets from forming
because the offering price has not been attractive enough to overcome the
obvious detriments. Even so, it is not unforeseeable that a cash-strapped
riparian state might be tempted by the lure of a large payout. Should the
country’s population continue to increase, as projections indicate, then it
is probable that demand will likewise increase as existing resources are
strained.
High water prices for interstate transfers are necessary to cover the
costs of large water sales.193 Such prices are nothing more than a selling
nevertheless in some measure affect interstate commerce or even, to some extent,
regulate it.”).
190. Net social benefit may shift in favor of water transfers if the price is high
enough. GRIFFIN, supra note 55, at 370.
191. See United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 551 (1973) (discussing the
fair market value test).
192. TERRY ANDERSON & PAMELA SNYDER, WATER MARKETS: PRIMING THE
INVISIBLE PUMP 19 (1997); Saliba et al., supra note 131, at 621 (discussing factors
affecting prices in existing water markets); Abrams, supra note 10, at 608 (“Absent
payment of a substantial purchase price, out-of-state diversions offer relatively little
benefit to the originating state.”); Bruce McCarl & Yongxia Cai, Economic,
Hydrologic and Environmental Appraisal of Texas Inter-basin Water Transfers:
Model Development and Initial Appraisal 3, TEX. WATER RES. INST. (2007),
http://texaseden.org/disaster-resources/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/economichydrologic-environ-appraisal-texas-inter-basin-water-transfers.pdf [https://perma
.cc/B69S-GSSH] (“Economic theory indicates that water should be allocated to
the highest valued users in order to achieve economic efficiency . . . . An
interbasin transfer can involve significant costs to the basin of origin along with
the benefits to the receiving basin. One cost can involve the opportunity cost to
the basin of origin of potentially reduced future economic growth and
prosperity.”) (internal citations omitted).
193. See WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 10, NAT’L RES. COUNCIL (1992) (“Water transfer law and policies

344404-LSU_80-3_Text.indd 113

8/17/20 7:18 AM

770

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

jurisdiction’s cost–benefit analysis, based on the best available
information, that seeks to determine the point where the benefits outweigh
determinable costs.194 Because the costs—both actual and opportunity—
to a selling state would be high, the tipping point would logically need to
be even higher.195
Can a selling state truly monetize all of the costs and externalities that
interstate water sales create and incorporate their cumulative effect into
the selling price? It is debatable, particularly in light of the fact that water’s
value and opportunity costs accrue over time.196 Moreover, downstream
states in these sales would be left with no representation in negotiations
and no ability to demand remediation financing from the purchasing
jurisdictions.197 In interstate water markets, the third party externalities
may be minimized somewhat by limiting marketable water only to the
“tradeable margin,”198 recognized in some states as “excess” water.199

should be designed to consider the interests of the trading partners, third parties,
and the environment in a cost-effective manner. The costs of mitigating third party
effects should be internalized as a cost of the transfer—that is, the beneficiaries
or proponents of the transfer should bear the mitigation costs as a matter of law
and equity. Therefore, the cost of the transfer should include sufficient funds to
help mitigate third party effects, in the form of water, money, or other
compensation.”).
194. ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 192, at 21–29 (1997) (analyzing such
cost–benefit analyses).
195. As Professor Glennon explains, “Economics suggest that the real cost of
water is the replacement value of the water.” GLENNON, supra note 1, at 225.
196. See ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 192, at 19; Saliba et al., supra note
131, at 621 (“If water transfers positively or negatively affect third parties and
these effects (externalities) are not taken into account in market transactions,
prices will not reflect full social values.”).
197. ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 192, at 19 (discussing third-party
externalities); Letter from Harry Vorhoff, Duncan Kemp, and Ryan Seidemann,
supra note 30. It is easy to see that downstream states would consider injunctive
relief in such instances, which would conceivably be tried at the U.S. Supreme
Court. See U.S. Const. art III, § 2.
198. Gary D. Lynne & Phyllis Saarinent, Melding Private and Public Interests
in Water Rights Markets, 25 J. AGRIC. & APPLIED ECONS. 69, 75 (1993)
(discussing such a “tradeable margin”).
199. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-22-304 (2011); ARK. NAT’L RES.
COMM’N., ARKANSAS WATER PLAN, at 24–25 (2014). As explained above, this is
a misnomer because it mischaracterizes the importance of flooding by relying
upon an anthropocentric viewpoint.
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In existing intrastate markets, water has proven to be a particularly
difficult commodity to price.200 It is seriously undervalued in the American
West,201 an area that should be sending compelling price signals to
consumers.202 Hopefully, high water prices would “alter [western states’]
consumption patterns in response to price increases.”203 Interstate
purchasers would theoretically disburse their high costs onto the ultimate
consumers,204 which would increase public awareness about water scarcity
in areas that often take their cheap water rates for granted.205 This
approach, hopefully, would challenge water consumers to reduce waste
and increase efficiency in arid areas.206
Exactly how should a riparian jurisdiction price water sales? First, the
price must reflect a best estimate of the public’s actual and opportunity
costs (already a large number),207 plus mitigation measures for known
externalities (also an incredibly large number), all administrative costs
(including studies on potential detriments and consistent monitoring), and
some additional amount to incentivize the selling jurisdiction to part with
200. See NICHOLAS SPULBER ET AL., ECONOMICS OF WATER RESOURCES:
FROM REGULATION TO PRIVATIZATION xvii (1998).
201. See Amy Hardberger, Water Is a Girl’s Best Friend: Examining the Water
Valuation Dilemma, 62 KAN. L. REV. 893, 912–15 (2014).
202. Water: The World’s Most Valuable Stuff, ECONOMIST (May 22, 2010),
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2010/05/20/the-worlds-most-valuable-stuff
[https://perma.cc/A9Z3-BK4S] (“As for the market, when it approaches water it
meets all sorts of obstacles: water is difficult to move, difficult to measure,
difficult to price and often difficult to charge for, since many people think it
should be free. Even in arid market economies where every drop is precious, the
price of water seldom reflects scarcity.”); ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 192,
at 18 (“When scarcity drives up the price of a resource, users . . . are motivated to
find alternative sources of supply . . . . In the case of water, such price signals are
often lacking, but where they do exist, efficiency gains from marginal adjustments
are significant.”).
203. GLENNON, supra note 2, at 220.
204. Lynne & Saarinent, supra note 198, at 71 (“[M]arket transmits all
relevant value information through prices back to the resource users.”).
205. Dellapenna, supra note 157, at 335 (“Economic incentives should be
introduced for those who use water so they will more realistically evaluate the
social consequences of their conduct.”) (citations omitted); ANDERSON &
SNYDER, supra note 192, at 10 (“What is seen as waste or inefficient water use in
rural and urban areas is simply the users’ rational response to low water prices
. . . But users can afford to be wasteful only when water is cheap.”).
206. GRIFFIN, supra note 55, at 243 (discussing pricing’s role in demand
management strategy).
207. Id. at 371 (“Achieving efficient water use is fundamentally about
recognizing water’s opportunity costs.”).
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its water (conceptually, the profit).208 This is the most equitable manner of
determining water price because it shifts the true cost of water transfers
onto the purchasing basin.209
Second, interstate water transfers need to use tiered block pricing.210
Because interstate water transfers should probably be a last means of water
management, they must reflect a desire to curb demand. Tiered pricing
operates by charging higher amounts once demand reaches certain
quantity thresholds.211 Water transfers should work in the same manner: x
for the first 10,000 acre–feet, 3x for the second 10,000 acre–feet, 9x for
the third 10,000 acre–feet, and so on. Such a pricing structure provides a
clear understanding of the price of water—as each additional unit of water
is consumed and the marginal utility to individual consumers drops,212 this
structure prices out the water uses that offer only marginal utility to
society. Research shows that tiered block pricing is an effective means of
reducing excess consumption among consumers.213
From an economic perspective, a selling state should avoid setting a
quantity of water at a specific rate per gallon or charging a flat fee.214 This
approach provides no incentive for the purchasing state to look at water
conservation methods, would increase a purchasing state’s dependency on
out-of-state water, and would do nothing to solve the long-term water
scarcity issue. In contrast, tiered pricing sends collective price signals to
consumers—through purchasing entities who disburse their costs and
educate consumers—that it is in their best interest to demand less water
where possible.

208. See id. at 36, 110, 118.
209. WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 193.
210. Water markets in California already use this pricing incentive. See
Bourree Lam, Finding the Right Price for Water, ATLANTIC (Mar. 24, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/03/finding-the-right-price-for
-water/388246/ [https://perma.cc/Z9RQ-QU65].
211. GRIFFIN, supra note 55, at 245–48.
212. See Saliba et al., supra note 131, at 619–20 (discussing diminishing
margin utility in a hypothetical water market).
213. See Ariel Dinar et al., Allocation-Based Water Pricing Promotes
Conservation While Keeping User Costs Low, 17 AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECONS.
UPDATE 1 (2014).
214. For a comparison of flat, fixed, and block pricing rates in the context of
California water markets, see Kristina Donnelly & Juliet Christian-Smith, An
Overview of the “New Normal” and Water Rate Basics 7–13, PAC. INST. (June
2013), http://pacinst.org/app/uploads/2013/06/pacinst-new-normal-and-water-ratebasics.pdf [https://perma.cc/53P4-PDM3].

344404-LSU_80-3_Text.indd 116

8/17/20 7:18 AM

2020]

PITFALLS OF INTERSTATE WATER TRANSFERS

773

The length of sale is also pertinent. Selling jurisdictions would
probably prefer only short-term water sales.215 A small window for these
water transfer experiments allows actors to correct their mistakes where
they undervalue the price of water or overestimate their ability to
compensate for the water that is sold. This is particularly important
because hydrologic uncertainty in the purchasing or selling jurisdiction
can drastically impact the true value of water.216 Short-term sales keep
selling jurisdictions from being held hostage by deals that commit water
to other jurisdictions.
Additionally, selling jurisdictions will likely require certain
contingencies before water can be transferred, such as the ability to
terminate water transfers because of unforeseeable drought, natural
disasters, or health emergencies like the recent COVID-19 pandemic.217
Selling states may want to know how the purchasing states will use their
water and might agree to sales so long as the water is used to satisfy only
certain types of demand—for example, municipal supply or health care—
or so long as the purchaser educates its consumers about best consumption
practices.218 Seasonal rates may also have their place.219
Could these contingencies be a potential deal-killer? Absolutely.
These contingencies are some of the many options, however, available to
selling states to keep them from the brunt of a bad deal. These
contingencies will also require demand for water to reach such a point that
purchasing states are willing to accept the risks.
D. The Morality of Selling Water
One of the foundational problems surrounding new water transfers is
whether water should actually be sold. The resource is essential to life. In
most communities, consumers primarily pay for transportation and

215. See Peter W. Culp, Robert Glennon, & Gary Libecap, Shopping for
Water: How the Market Can Mitigate Water Shortages in the American West,
STANFORD WOODS INST. FOR ENV’T 13–15 (2014) (listing the benefits of
intrastate short-term water right sales or leases).
216. Saliba et al., supra note 131, at 646–47.
217. GRIFFIN, supra note 55, at 205 (discussing dry-year options and leasing).
This has strong support in the common law of contracts, where a party may be
excused from performance when actions beyond its control render performance
futile or impossible. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (AM. LAW
INST. 1981).
218. See IOWA DEP’T NAT. RES., supra note 116, at 21.
219. See GRIFFIN, supra note 55, at 248.
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administration costs of the delivery system, not for the actual water.220 In
water marketing literature, there is often a philosophical desire to keep this
resource as cheap as possible. These arguments often center on the need
for progress as a society and harmony among the states.221 The reasoning
goes that in order to solve the water scarcity “problem,” everyone should
play their part because transfers “promote the public interest by allowing
established uses to change with evolving values and needs.”222
The humanitarian argument for cheap water transfers can appear
tempting to buy into, but riparian jurisdictions must steer clear of the lure.
It is nothing more than a misunderstanding of water economics. Water
transported across state lines does not function along the inelastic demand
curve that economists associate with typical municipal drinking water
supplies. Rather, this water functions with far more elasticity because this
water is for “wants,” not “needs.”223 Price has to reflect that reality.
If a region intends to pry water away from its neighbor, it must create
a willing seller. The best way to do that is through a price that compensates
the seller for costs, direct and indirect impacts, and third-party spillover
effects. If that sum is so high that it discourages sales, then so be it.224 All
selling states will incur some harm by selling their water, even those
waters considered to be “excess.”225 It makes no sense to “solve” a water
scarcity issue in one location by creating a new one elsewhere.
220. See GLENNON, supra note 1, at 224–25. Property rights mirror this by
taking the form of a usufruct rather than a pure personal property right.
221. See Singleterry, supra note 110, at 534, 544; William Staudenmaier,
Interstate Water Compacts: The Supreme Court Once Again Endorses State
Sovereignty over Water Resources, BLOOMBERG BNA NEWS (June 26, 2013),
http://www.bna.com/interstate-water-compacts-n17179874750/ [https://perma.cc
/48BH-N6RD].
222. D. Craig Bell & Norman Johnson, State Water Laws and Federal Water
Uses: The History of Conflict, the Prospects for Accommodation, 21 ENVTL. L. 1,
14–15 (1991).
223. GRIFFIN, supra note 55, at 36 (“[H]eightened costs are relevant to the
maximization of social net benefits, so it is a good thing that attention to [] costs
results in less water being employed in more costly applications.”).
224. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
55 (2004) (“If the sale of property would result, directly or indirectly, in harm to
people not involved in the transaction itself, then discouraging sales may be
socially beneficial.”).
225. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-22-301 (2011) (charging the Arkansas Natural
Resources Commission to determine whether excess surface water exists that
might be put to beneficial use); id. § 15-22-304 (2011) (defining “excess surface
water” to be calculated from average annual basin yield, existing use, instream
flow, and future water demand).
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Most of the country’s water use issues can be addressed by better
consumption and conservation management at the local level—that is,
dealing with demand.226 Addressing the demand for water is a more
effective manner of dealing with scarcity than simply increasing the
supply,227 as making more water available only provides a false sense of
security that will likely fail to communicate supply issues.228
Prior appropriation jurisdictions are in the best position to know which
water management practices will and will not work for their states.229 They
are in an undesirable position, but they do have tools. Many states and
municipalities already focus on what they can do to mitigate their water
shortage problems without new sources of supply.230 The solution to water
shortages will not come from solely turning on a new spigot—particularly
such an expensive one.
CONCLUSION
As the country’s water demand increases and aquifers cannot
sufficiently recharge, the temptation of interstate water transfers will only
grow. Riparian jurisdictions must balance the desire to exploit their water
resources with the short- and long-term issues they face from a voluntary
loss of water. They have stewardship responsibilities to their citizens and
downstream states that would feel an impact from water sales without
representation or compensation. Riparian states can and should use a high
price shield to fend off nearly all interstate water market proposals—
except those that can properly compensate them. By using effective
pricing as one of their many tools for water conservation, riparian states
can effectively balance their trustee responsibility within the limits of their
federalism roles.
226. See GLENNON, supra note 1, at 315–25.
227. See GRIFFIN, supra note 55, at 4 (discussing demand management versus
supply enhancement strategies); Olen Pease, The Commerce Clause, Interstate
Compacts, and Marketing Water Across State Boundaries, 46 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 601, 602–03 (2006) (“[I]n many instances, the real issue is not inadequate
supply, but inefficient uses such as failing to conserve water or using water to
produce low value goods.”).
228. Klein, supra note 27, at 249–50.
229. See, e.g., McCarl & Cai, supra note 192 (implementing an “economic,
hydrological model” to calculate and maximize the net benefits of interbasin water
transfers within Texas); Ronald Kaiser, Texas Water Marketing in the Next
Millennium: A Conceptual and Legal Analysis, 27 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 181 (1996)
(analyzing the Texas water shortage).
230. See, e.g., GLENNON, supra note 1, at 174–76 (describing San Antonio’s
water conservation program).
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